Metaphysicians have wondered about the status of quantitative properties, like mass, charge, and distance. Are they fundamentally properties of objects (or pairs of objects, in the case of distance) or are they fundamentally constituted by comparative relations? Philosophers of science and social scientists have wondered about the nature of measurement - what does it take for some feature of the world to admit of a numerical scale for measurement? Epistemologists and decision theorists have considered many arguments about what it takes for credence and utility to be rational. In this seminar, we will consider these three topics and the relations between them, and hopefully we will be able to clarify some of the issues at their intersection.
Jan. 14, Introduction
No reading for this week
Jan. 21, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence
Read the whole correspondence in one of these editions (I prefer the modernized):
Some supplementary notes:
Feb. 11 (I will be out of town)
David Christensen, "Measuring Confirmation"
Ellery Eells and Branden Fitelson, "Measuring Confirmation and Evidence"
Chapter 1 of Luce/Krantz/Suppes/Tversky, Foundations of Measurement Theory
Mar. 18 (Spring Break)
Sections 2.5, 2.6 (pp. 76-98) of Fred Roberts, Measurement Theory. You may want to review the first half of the chapter as well, which covers similar material to the Luce/Krantz/Suppes/Tversky. Read through the exercises at the end of the two sections we are reading, and think about them, but don't worry about writing them up or anything.
Apr. 1 (canceled - I am out of town)
Geoff Lee, "The Experience of Left and Right"
Shamik Dasgupta, "Absolutism vs. Comparativism about Quantity"